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Abstract 
Purchasing  reinsurance  reduces  insurers’  insolvency  risk  by  stabilizing  loss  experience, 
increasing capacity, limiting liability on specific risks, and/or protecting against catastrophes. 
Consequently, reinsurance purchase should reduce capital costs. However, transferring risk to 
reinsurers  is  expensive.  The  cost  of  reinsurance  for  an  insurer  can  be  much  larger  than  the 
actuarial price of the risk transferred. In this article, we analyze empirically the costs and the 
benefits of reinsurance for a sample of U.S. property-liability insurers. The results show that 
reinsurance  purchase  increases  significantly  the  insurers’  costs  but  reduces  significantly  the 
volatility of the loss ratio. With purchasing reinsurance, insurers accept to pay higher costs of 
insurance production to reduce their underwriting risk. 
Keywords: reinsurance, insolvency risk, risk management, financial intermediation, cost 
functions, panel data.1 
 
The Costs and Benefits of Reinsurance 
1.  Introduction 
Insurers issue policies and collect premiums against the promise of paying claims when 
accidents occur. For many types of insurance, the gap between the time of the accident and the 
time of the settlement could reach several years. If an insurer is defaulting during that period, 
policyholders could lose part of their claims. Therefore, the ultimate interest of any policyholder 
is the continued financial viability of the insurance company. Policyholders cannot diversify their 
risk by using many insurers and they do not perfectly monitor the managers of the insurance 
companies because it is costly and requires a specialized expertise. Furthermore, the potential of 
large  catastrophic  losses  and  the  cyclical  nature  of  the  insurance  business  exacerbate  the 
incentives conflict between the different stakeholders (Cummins, Harrington and Klein, 1991; 
Harrington and Niehaus, 2000; Weiss, 2007). Managing the underwriting residual risks through 
reinsurance purchase could limit large losses, alleviate the insurance cycle, and reduce agency 
costs.  Hence,  reinsurance  reduces  insolvency  risk  and  strengthens  the  financial  viability  of 
insurance firms. 
Most of reinsurance demand studies consider that insurers purchase reinsurance for the 
same reasons that motivate firms in other industries to purchase insurance or to actively manage 
their  risks:  limiting  the  expected  costs  of  financial  distress,  stabilizing  sources  of  funding, 
decreasing  expected  taxes  by  exploiting  the  convex  structure  of  the  tax  code,  and  gaining 
comparative advantages in real services production (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Jean-Baptiste and 
Santomero, 2000; Cole and McCullough, 2006; Powell and Sommer, 2007; Adams, Hardwick 
and Zoo, 2008). Maximization of expected utility is another motivation for reinsurance demand 
(Aase, 2004; and Kaluszka and Okolewski, 2008). 
Corporate  finance  theory  suggests  that  firms  purchase  insurance  to  help  solve 
underinvestment  problems.  The  underinvestment  problem  occurs  when  stockholders  have 2 
 
incentives to forgo an investment with positive net present value because all the benefits from the 
investment will accrue to debt holders. Mayers and Smith (1987) and Garven and MacMinn 
(1993) show that firms could guarantee incentive compatibility by including a covenant in the 
debt contract requiring insurance coverage.  
The  incentives  conflict  between  stockholders  and  policyholders  is  specific  to  stock 
insurers.  With  the  mutual  ownership  structure  there  is  no  such  incentives  conflict  because 
policyholders are themselves the owners. However, mutual insurers purchase reinsurance in the 
same manner as stock insurers. The mutual ownership structure reduces the access of insurers to 
the  capital  market.  Therefore,  mutuals  have  traditionally  relied  on  retained  earnings  as  the 
primary, if not sole, source of capital. Retaining sufficient capital could prevent the need for 
frequent variations in premiums and dampen the effects of extraordinary periodic underwriting 
losses but could also create a free cash-flow problem. Wells, Cox and Gaver (1995) find that 
mutual insurers have a greater level of free cash flow than stock insurers. Thus, mutual insurers 
purchase reinsurance as an alternative source of capital and to reduce the free cash flow problem.
  Transferring  risk  to  reinsurers  is  expensive.  In  an  examination  of  the  catastrophe 
reinsurance market, Froot (2001) finds that insurers pay several times the actuarial price of the 
risk transferred. The high price of reinsurance relative to expected losses could be explained by 
the combinations of many factors affecting the reinsurance market equilibrium. The shortage of 
capital  in  reinsurance  and  the  resulting  capacity  shortfall  drives-up  the  price  of  reinsurance, 
especially following large losses. The agency problems that reinsurers face, due to shareholder-
manager incentives conflict and the lack of transparency, increase the costs of reinsurance capital 
and consequently increase reinsurance prices. Furthermore, it seems that reinsurers’ market power 
has intensified over time with the increase in the capital and market shares of large reinsurers 
(Cummins and Weiss, 2000b). 
In  this  article,  we  estimate  the  effect  of  reinsurance  purchase  on  the  costs  and  the 
underwriting  risks  of  U.S.  property-liability  insurers  (554  insurers  between  1995  and  2003). 3 
 
Firstly, to estimate insurers’ cost function we consider ceded premiums to professional reinsurers 
as an output quality variable. Hence, for a given level of output, an insurer purchasing more 
reinsurance is considered as producing a higher quality of insurance services. Since purchasing 
reinsurance is costly, this same insurer will operate with higher costs. We specify a cost function 
with  four  outputs  (long  and  short-tail  personal,  long  and  short-tail  commercial),  one  output 
quality variable (reinsurance as measured by ceded premiums), two intermediate output variables 
(risk management and financial intermediation as defined by Cummins et al. (2007)), six input 
prices (administrative labour, agent labour, risk labour, material, debt and equity) and yearly 
dummy  variables.  Reinsurance,  risk  management  and  financial  intermediation  are  treated  as 
endogeneous variables. The results show that reinsurance positively and significantly affects the 
costs of the insurers in our sample.  
Secondly, to estimate the effect of reinsurance purchase on insurers’ underwriting risks 
we consider the growth rate of ceded premiums to non affiliates as a potential determinant of the 
growth rate of the volatility of the loss ratio. We control for the growth in underwriting risks 
exposure by including the growth rate of premiums written in each type of business and the 
growth  rate  of  business  concentration  and  geographic  concentration.  The  results  show  that 
purchasing more reinsurance significantly decreases the volatility of loss ratio.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the costs and 
benefits of reinsurance. Section 3 proposes the econometric model and estimation method, while 
Section 4 presents the data and variables. Section 5 presents and analyses the main results, and 
Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Defining the Costs and Benefits of Reinsurance 
Reinsurance purchase is essentially a capital structure decision. Insurers seek to keep an 
optimal level of underwriting risk relative to their capitalization level. In the case of large losses, 
equity holders are only liable to pay losses until the assets of the company have been depleted. If 4 
 
there are remaining losses to be paid, equity holders have the option to declare bankruptcy and 
default in the remaining  losses.  Phillips,  Cummins,  and  Allen  (1998)  find  that  policyholders 
consider the value of the insolvency option when deciding how much they are willing to pay for 
the  insurance  contract.  To  achieve  their  solvency  target,  insurers  could  increase  their 
capitalization by raising new capital or reduce the risk by transferring a part of it to reinsurers. 
Thus, reinsurance plays the role of a substitute for capital (Hoerger, Sloan, and Hassan, 1990; and 
Garven and Lamm Tennant, 2003).  
With reinsurance contracts, an insurer transfers premiums collected from customers to a 
reinsurer. In turn, the reinsurer accepts to bear a part of the risk assumed by the insurer. With 
proportional reinsurance, premiums and claims are shared between the insurer and the reinsurer in 
the proportion stipulated in the contractual agreement. In addition, the reinsurer pays a “ceding 
commission” to the insurer to compensate it for the costs of underwriting the ceded business. 
However,  the  commission  is  also  determined  by  the  nature  and  composition  of  the  insured 
business and by the underwriting results. In non-proportional reinsurance, the reinsurer assumes 
only the losses that exceed a certain amount, called the retention or priority. In calculating the 
price  of  the  risk  transferred,  the  reinsurer  takes  into  account  the  loss  experience  during  the 
previous years and the expected future losses according to the type of risks involved. 
An insurer will accept to pay loading fees over the actuarial price of the risk transferred. 
The loading fees should correspond to the cost of the marginal capital needed to support the risk. 
Since the cost and the quantity of the capital needed to support the risk could be different for the 
insurer and the reinsurer, the transaction could take place without arbitrage. The reinsurance 
contract is generally negotiated and signed before the beginning of its effectiveness. At that time, 
the agreement is accepted by both sides and considered as a fair contract. Moreover, loading fees 
could include the price of insurer’s benefits from reinsurer product development skills and risk 
management expertise. The reinsurer plays an important role in assessing and underwriting risks, 
and in assisting insurer’s efforts to handle claims efficiently (Swiss Re, 2004). 5 
 
An insurer is able to diversify underwriting risk when losses of individual policyholders 
are statistically independent. In insurance markets where risks are statistically independent, such 
as  automobile  collision  insurance,  the  expected  losses  from  a  large  pool  of  risks  are  highly 
predictable and the loss per claim is moderate. Hence, an insurer will provide coverage for large 
number of policyholders without having to hold large amounts of costly equity capital relative to 
the quantity of insurance being underwritten (Doherty and Dionne, 1993).  
The problem is that statistical independence is violated when a mega-catastrophe occurs. 
A single event can cause losses to many policyholders simultaneously. However, the risk of a 
catastrophe  in  the  U.S.  for  instance  is  independent  from  the  risk  of  a  catastrophe  in  other 
countries.  This  provides  an  economic  motivation  for  a  global  reinsurance  market.  The  U.S. 
insurance industry diversifies losses across the world to provide coverage and pay losses in areas 
such  as  Florida  and  California,  which  have  high  exposure  to  catastrophic  risks  and  large 
concentrations of property values. Thus, with global diversification, the amount of capital needed 
by international reinsurers to support catastrophic risks is lower than the amount of capital needed 
by local insurers. 
Insurance markets are subject to cycles, experiencing alternating phases of hard and soft 
markets (Cummins and Outreville, 1987; Cummins, Harrington, and Klein, 1991; Harrington and 
Niehaus, 2000; Weiss, 2007). In a hard market, the supply of coverage is restricted and prices 
rise, whereas in a soft market, coverage supply is plentiful and prices decline. Hard markets are 
usually triggered by capital depletions resulting from large event losses that cause insurers to 
reevaluate their pricing practices and reassess their exposure management. Following a large loss, 
it is difficult for insurers to raise capital at a relatively low cost. Thus, insurers have the choice 
between reducing coverage supply, increasing insolvency risk, and purchasing more reinsurance. 
Reinsurance allows insurers to maintain client relationships without increasing insolvency risk. 
However, underwriting cycles characterize both insurers and reinsurers because both of them 
share the large unexpected losses (Weiss and Chung, 2004; Meier and Outreville, 2006). In soft 6 
 
markets,  insurers  take  advantage  of  low  reinsurance  prices  and  high  coverage  supply  by 
reinsurers to increase their underwriting capacity.  In hard markets, when insurers have the largest 
need for reinsurance, reinsurers’ capacity is also reduced and reinsurance prices rise. Actually, 
this could aggravate insurers’ crisis in hard market (Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson, 1992).  
In spite of its susceptibility to cycles and crises, the reinsurance market is a global market, 
and capital markets respond quickly to new capital needs of reinsurers. Following catastrophic 
losses  in  2004-2005,  the  reinsurance  industry  raised  about  $30  billion  in  new  capital  in  a 
multitude ways: new equity capital for startup companies ($9.5 billion), seasoned equity issues 
($12.5 billion), sidecars ($5 billion), and CAT bonds ($5 billion) (Cummins, 2007). Because of 
this superior capacity to raise quickly new capital, the reinsurance market responded efficiently to 
large  unexpected  losses  and  reinsurance  prices  began  to  soften  in  late  2006  and  early  2007 
(Benfield, 2007b). Hence, reinsurance alleviates the underwriting cycle and increases the speed of 
primary insurers to get out of hard market periods. 
Even  if  reinsurance  prices  exceed  the  actuarial  price  of  the  risk  transferred,  the 
reinsurance  purchased  could  remain  profitable  if  the  benefits  are  higher  than  the  costs. 
Reinsurance reduces insurers’ insolvency risk by stabilizing loss experience, increasing capacity, 
limiting liability on specific risks, and/or protecting against catastrophes. In addition, the purchase 
of  reinsurance  reduces  incentive  conflicts  between  different  stakeholders  and  consequently 
reduces agency costs.  
3.  Econometric Models and Estimation Methods 
3.1. Costs analysis 
  Most of the existing studies account for the risk pooling and the financial intermediation 
functions in estimating the cost function of insurers (Cummins and Weiss, 2000a). Cummins et al. 
(2006)  account  also  for  asset-liability  management  activities.  They  consider  financial 
intermediation and asset-liability management as intermediate activities performed by the insurer. 7 
 
In this paper, we consider the amount of reinsurance purchased as an output attribute variable 
associated with the level of output produced by an insurer.
1  
We assume that insurance services are produced using a vector of inputs and two 
intermediate outputs: asset-liability risk management and financial intermediation. For a given 
level of insurance services, the amount of inputs used by an insurer would be affected by the level 
of ceded insurance (reinsurance). Presumably, reinsurance is costly and an insurer purchasing 
more reinsurance will have higher costs for a given level of insurance services. In this framework, 
reinsurance plays the role of an output attribute or quality variable defining more accurately the 
output of an insurer.  Therefore, we suppose that an insurer is producing insurance services 
according to the following production function: 
                                         ,Re; , , , , , 0
I R F Y Q R F X X X T ,                                 (1) 
where  Q  is  the  quantity  of  insurance  services  produced; Re  is  the  quantity  of  reinsurance 
purchased;  R and F are the intermediate outputs (asset-liability risk management and financial 
intermediation activities); 
I X , 
R X  and 
F X  are respectively the quantities of inputs used to 
produce insurance services, asset-liability risk management, and financial intermediation; and T  
represents time (for simplicity, we omit the time and firm subscripts). 
Under the assumption that insurance firms are cost minimizers and that Q, Re,  R andF  
are pre-determined, the restricted cost function associated with the technology described by (1) is: 
                                         T P P P F R Q CR CR F R I , , , , , Re, , ,                                    (2) 
where CR  are total costs, and 
I P  , 
R P , and 
F P  are, respectively, the prices of inputs 
I X , 
R X  
and 
F X . The restricted cost function defined by (2) gives the minimum cost of producing the 
level  of  insurance  services  (Q ),  given  the  level  of  reinsurance  (Re),  asset-liability  risk 
                                                 
1 See Dionne, Gagné and Vanasse, 1998 for a discussion on the utilization of output attributes in the context 
of transportation firms. 8 
 
management (R) and financial intermediation (F) undertaken by the insurer, the different input 
prices (
I P , 
R P , and 
F P ), and time  T  which is included to take into account technical change. 
Since the exact functional form of the restricted cost function defined by (2) is unknown, 
we use the well known translog approximation which is given by: 
                           
, s
ln ln ln
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F R Q CR
                     (3) 
where  subscripts  i   and  t ,  represent,  respectively,  firms  and  time,  and  t D   are  time  dummy 
variables  (the  sample  first  year  being  the  omitted  category).  The  intercept  i   and  the 
coefficients associated with the asset -liability risk management and financial intermediation 
variables (
R
i  and 
F
i ) are firm-specific. For the estimation, we treat these three parameters as 
random variables  which follow a normal distribution with means  , 
R,
F  and variance-
covariance  . Finally,  it u  are i.i.d. random disturbances. Linear homogeneity of degree one in 
input prices is imposed prior to estimation by dividing total costs and all input prices but one by 
this last price. Finally, all continuous variables on the right-hand side of (3) are divided by their 
sample means (the point of approximation). 
The reinsurance (Re), asset-liability risk management (R) and financial intermediation (F) 
variables are likely to be endogenous. Endogeneity is taken into account by first instrumenting 
these three variables. The set of instruments used includes the log of the insurance output and 
input  prices,  time  dummy  variables  and  other  dummy  variables  measuring  the  insurer’s 
characteristics:  ownership  structure,  group  membership,  distribution  system,  and  head  office 
state.  Output and input prices are determined, respectively, on the insurance and labour markets 
and therefore are properly considered exogenous. Also, ownership structure, group membership, 
distribution  system  and  head  office  state  are  most  of  the  time  once  and  for  all  decisions 9 
 
unaffected by the current situation of the firm (in fact, in our sample, these characteristics are 
constant over time for almost all firms). It is therefore very unlikely that unobserved variables 
affecting  reinsurance,  risk  management  and  financial  intermediation  would  also  affect  these 
variables. The predicted values of each endogenous variable are obtained from OLS regressions 
on the set of instruments and are substituted for the actual values in equation (3). Equation (3) is 
then  estimated  by  restricted/residual  maximum  likelihood  (REML)  as  implemented  in  the 
Xtmixed procedure of Stata. The proper test statistics of the different estimated parameters of the 
model are obtained from bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
3.2. Benefits analysis 
  Even though insurers can reduce underwriting risk by diversification, significant residual 
risk remains, and insurers’ claim payments are highly stochastic. Reinsurance is used to reduce 
insolvency risk by limiting large losses and alleviating the underwriting cycle.  Here, we measure 
the benefits of reinsurance through its effect on the volatility of the loss ratio (the ratio of present 
value  of  incurred  losses-to-earned  premiums).  Thus,  to  assess  the  consequence  of  insurers’ 
decision to purchase more or less reinsurance on underwriting risk we estimate the following 
equation: 
                                     it t t it Z it X it Re it e D Z X Re lr                        (4) 
where  it lr is the growth rate of the volatility of loss ratio during the current year,  it Re is 
the growth rate of the reinsurance purchased during the current year,  it X is a vector of variables 
measuring the growth rate of insurers’ exposure to underwriting risks,  it Z is a vector of insurers’ 
specific control variables, and  t D are time dummy variables.  
  To measure the growth rate in insurers’ exposure to underwriting risks, we use the growth 
rate of premiums written in each type of business, the growth rate of business concentration, the 
growth rate of geographic concentration, and the growth rate of insurer size. Concentration is 10 
 
measured using Herfindahl indices based on net premiums written. As control variables, we use 
insurers’  specific  characteristics:  ownership  structure,  group  membership,  and  distribution 
system.
2 
4.  Data and Variables 
4.1. Data 
The primary data for our analysis are taken from the regulatory annual statements filed by 
U.S.  property-liability  insurers  with  the  National  Association  of  Insurance  Commissioners 
(NAIC). We include data for all property-liability insurance firms reporting to the NAIC for the 
period 1995 through 2003. However, we eliminate reporting firms showing negative surplus, 
assets, losses, or expenses. Such firms are not viable operating entities but are retained in the 
database by the NAIC for regulatory purposes such as the resolution of insolvencies. Because 
insurers formulate investment and risk management strategies at the overall corporate level, our 
analysis focuses on groups of insurers under common ownership and unaffiliated single insurance 
firms. Data for insurance groups are obtained by aggregating the data for affiliated insurance 
firms which are members of the group. Our analysis focuses on multiple line insurance firms 
reporting strictly positive output in each of the four lines of insurance business: long-tail personal, 
short-tail personal, long-tail commercial and short-tail commercial, where the length of the tail 
refers to the length of the claims payout period for the line of business. Also, insurers reporting 
non-strictly positive input prices, asset-liability risk, or reinsurance are dropped as well.  
Our final samples include 2,966 observations (554 firms). Even though the restriction of 
strictly positive outputs in all four lines reduces the sample size, most of the firms eliminated are 
small  specialized firms.    In  fact,  our  sample  accounts  for  about 90  percent  of  total industry 
premium volume in 2003. 
                                                 
2 The Hausman test shows that the growth rate of reinsurance and the growth rate of size are endogenous. 




4.2. Costs Analysis 
Most previous studies estimating insurer cost functions consider only the net business 
assumed, excluding reinsurance quantity from the outputs and reinsurance costs from the total 
costs. In this paper, since we include reinsurance as an output attribute, we adjust the definition of 
total costs and the definition of quantities of outputs to reflect those of the total business written 
and not only outputs and costs associated with the net business assumed. 
4.2.1. Total costs 
The total costs of the net business assumed are generally computed as the sum of total 
expenses (net of loss adjustment expenses, which are part of the incurred loss outputs) and the 
cost of capital. To measure total costs related to the total business written we should add the costs 
of underwriting the ceded premiums to reinsurers. Because direct insurers issue insurance policies 
and assume all the attached administrative costs, they receive a compensation in the form of 
commissions from reinsurers when they cede the premiums collected. Thus, the total costs (Costs) 
of business underwritten is the sum of total expenses, commissions received from the reinsurers, 
and the cost of capital. 
The cost of capital is the sum of the cost of equity capital and the cost of debt capital.
3 
The equity capital (Equity) is defined as the sum of policyholders’ surplus and the redundant 
statutory liabilities (excess of statutory over statement reserves plus provision for reinsurance). 
The  debt  capital  (Debt),  i.e.  liabilities,  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  losses  and  loss  adjustment 
expenses reserves, unearned premium reserves, and borrowed money. 
4.2.2. Output quantities and output prices 
The conventional measures of the quantities of outputs for insurers are incurred losses in 
the  four  principal  property-liability  insurance  business  lines:  Long-tail  personal,  Short-tail 
personal, Long-tail commercial and Short-tail commercial. The output quantity for a given year is 
                                                 
3 The cost of equity capital is the average quantity of equity capital hold by the insurer during the year 
multiplied by Equity price. The cost of debt capital is the average quantity of debt capital hold by the 
insurer during the year multiplied by Debt price.  Equity price and debt price are defined below. 12 
 
usually defined as the present value of incurred losses arising only from the exposure related to 
the business written during that year. Losses paid during that year but arising from exposures 
related  to  the  business  written  during  previous  years  are  not  included  in  that  year’s  output 
quantity. To compute the present value of incurred losses we use the chain ladder parameters and 
the interest rates term structure obtained for the estimation of liabilities’ effective duration.
4 
To be consistent with our approach of accounting for reinsurance, we measure the output 
associated with the total business written by insurer and not only the output of the net business 
assumed. Thus, incurred losses associated with the premiums ceded to non affiliated insurers are 
included in the total output produced by direct insurers.  
Output prices are calculated as the difference between premiums earned and the output 
quantity expressed as a ratio to the output quantity:  Output priceikt = [Premiumikt – Qikt]/Qikt, 
where Premium is premium earned, Q is the output quantity, and subscripts i, k, and t refer to 
insurer i, output k and year t, respectively. Thus, for each insurer we obtain four different prices: 
Price of long-tail personal, Price of short-tail personal, Price of long-tail commercial and Price 
of short-tail commercial. 
  4.2.3. Reinsurance  
  The quantity of reinsurance purchased is an attribute of the output produced by 
direct insurers. Everything else being equal, insurers purchasing more reinsurance are assumed 
to  have  lower insolvency  risk.  Reinsurance  reduces the insolvency  risk  of  direct insurers  by 
stabilizing their loss experience, limiting their liabilities, and protecting against catastrophes. The 
most  common  measure  of  the  quantity  of  reinsurance  purchased  is  Premiums  ceded  to  non- 
affiliates.  However,  since  larger  insurers  produce  more  outputs,  they  can  purchase  a  larger 
quantity of reinsurance compared to small insurers without ceding a higher proportion of the 
premiums written. Reinsurance demand studies show that larger insurers cede a lower proportion 
                                                 
4 The chain ladder method is a widely accepted actuarial technique for measuring loss payout patterns.  See 
Taylor (2000). 13 
 
of  premiums  written  compared  to  smaller  insurers  (Mayers  and  Smith,  1990;  and  Cole  and 
McCullough, 2006). In our analysis, we also use the share of written premiums that is ceded to 
non-affiliates insurers (Share ceded to non-affiliates) as an alternative measure of reinsurance.   
4.2.4. Intermediate Outputs 
  The  first  intermediate  function  we  consider  is  financial  intermediation.  The  insurer 
receives the premium payments from policyholders at the beginning of the period. When a claim 
occurs, the insurer pays the amount of the claim at some time in the future. The period between 
the date of the claim occurrence and the date of the claim payment depends on the type of 
insurance policy. Financial intermediation activities consist in investing the amount of premiums 
received until the claim is paid. We measure the quantity of financial intermediation activities by 
the value of total assets under management, which is equal to invested assets (Invested Assets). 
This  measure  of  intermediate  output  has  been  used  in  several  insurance  efficiency  studies 
(Cummins and Weiss, 2000a) and is equivalent to measures used in banks’ efficiency studies 
under the intermediation approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
The second intermediate function is risk management. During the 1995-2003 period, U.S. 
property-liability insurers invested on average 62 percent in bonds, 14 percent in common stocks, 
2 percent in preferred stocks and 20 percent in cash and short-term investments. Thus, the two 
main risks that affect the value of assets of property-liability insurers are interest rate risk and 
credit risk. In this study we focus on interest rate risk. 
  Reducing the insurer’s financial risk could create value through, among other things, 
reducing the market discount in insurance premiums for insolvency risk. As a result, managing 
the impact of interest rate movements on both assets and liabilities is crucial for insurers (Staking 
and  Babbel,  1995;  Santomero  and  Babbel,  1997).  We  use  the  dollar  duration  of  the  surplus 
(Asset-liability  Risk)  as  a  proxy  for  the  quantity  of  output  associated  with  risk  management 14 
 
activities.
5 The dollar duration of the surplus is defined as:  SDS = A DA – PV(L) DL, where DS is 
the duration of surplus, DA is the duration of assets, DL is the effective duration of liabilities, A is 
the market value of invested assets, and PV(L) is the present value of liabilities. The surplus of the 
firm is immunized (DS = 0) when the effect of the interest rate changes on assets is equal to the 
effect of interest rate changes on liabilities. We do not assume that nil duration of surplus is 
optimal for insurers. The dollar duration of the surplus is a measure of the quantity of risk that is 
left after the insurer conducts risk management activities. Rather, we assume that more insurers’ 
risk  management  activities  imply  a  smaller  dollar  surplus  duration,  which  contributes  to 
increasing the insurer’s value added for the policyholders.
6 
4.2.5. Variable Inputs 
Insurers use three primary inputs – labour, materials and business services, and capital.  
In order to better measure the effects of risk management activities, we utilize three labour inputs 
– administrative labour services, agent labour services, and risk management labour services.  
Prior  insurance  efficiency  papers  have  lumped  together  administrative  and  risk  management 
labour into a single category.  Separating administrative and risk management labour allows us to 
measure variations in the intensity of risk management across insurers.  The other inputs, which 
are standard in insurance analyses, are materials and business services, debt capital, and equity 
capital.  Administrative  labour  and  materials/business  services  are  shared  by  insurance,  risk 
management, and financial intermediation activities and, therefore, prices are the same for these 
activities. Agent labour services are only used for insurance activities. Risk management labour 
services are used only for the risk management activities. Debt capital and equity capital are 
inputs needed for financial management and also to support the insurance activities through their 
impact on insolvency risk. 
The price of administrative labour services (Administrative Labour) is the average weekly 
                                                 
5 Surplus is the term used for the book-value of equity capital in the insurance industry. 
6 See Cummins et al. (2006) for details on the computation of the dollar duration of the surplus. 15 
 
wage in the U.S. state where the head office of the insurer is located for SIC code 6331- Fire, 
Marine, and Casualty Insurers. The price of agent labour services (Agent Labour) is a weighted 
average of the average weekly wages in each U.S. state where the insurer operates for SIC code 
6411- Insurance agents and brokers. In that case, the weight is the share of premiums written in 
each state by the insurance firm. The price of risk management input (Risk Labour) is the average 
weekly wage in each U.S. state where the head office of the insurer is located for the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 52392- Portfolio management. The price 
of materials/business services (Business Labour) is the average weekly wage also in the U.S. state 
where the head office is located for SIC code 7300 - Business services. The SIC and NAICS 
average  weekly  wages  used  to  compute  prices  are  obtained  from  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics. 
The price associated with debt capital (Debt Price) is defined as the required return by 
policyholders.  This  required  return  is  a  function  of  the  credit  quality  of  the  insurer  and  the 
expected waiting time between the occurrence of the accident and the payment of the claim. We 
compute Debt Price for each insurer as the annualized interest rate equivalent to the rate on the 
term structure corresponding to the firm’s credit quality and with maturity equal to the effective 
duration of the insurer’s liabilities. This produces a different price for each insurer varying by its 
credit quality and its liability’s effective duration.
7 
The price associated with equity capital (Equity Price) is defined as the required return by 
equity holders. We use the Fama-French three-factor model to estimate the required returns for 
listed insurers on financial markets.
8 We assume that listed and unlisted insurers that have the 
same credit quality also have the same required return on equity. In other words, we categorize 
insurers by debt quality and take an average within each debt rating of the Fam a-French cost of 
                                                 
7  The  credit  quality  term  structures  are  obtained  from  Bloomberg,  and  the  insurer’s  credit  quality  is 
obtained from Best’s Key Rating Guide (A.M. Best Co). 
8 We split listed insurers into three groups based on their A.M. Best’s rating. For each year, we estimate the 
cost of equity capital for each group. The prices of the Fama-French three risk factors were obtained from 
Kenneth French’s website. 16 
 
capital for the listed insurers. 
4.2.6. Control Variables 
Yearly dummy variables (Year96-Year03) are used to take into account of time. Also, a 
set of other dummy variables is used to account for insurer characteristics. The Stock ownership 
dummy is equal to 1 for stock insurers and is equal to 0 otherwise. The Group dummy is equal to 
1 if the insurer is an insurance group and is equal to 0 otherwise. The Distribution dummy is 
equal to 1 if the insurer uses independent agents and is equal to 0 otherwise; and the State(s) 
dummy equals 1 if the head office of the insurer is in state s. The omitted state is New York. 
4.3. Benefits Analysis 
  To assess the benefits of reinsurance purchase we estimate equation (4).The dependent 
variable in equation (4) is the Growth rate of the volatility of the loss ratio. The loss ratio is 
defined as the ratio of present value of incurred losses to premiums earned during the same year. 
It is measured as:  1 , 1 , t i t i it it lr lr lr lr  where  it lr) ( is the volatility of the 
loss ratio including current year t and  1 , ) ( t i lr is the volatility of the loss ratio excluding current 
year t. In other words: 
t
n t j
j it lr lr n lr





j t i lr lr n lr  where n is the 
number of historical observations used to calculate the volatility of the loss ratio. We use the 
historical data reported by insurers in Schedule P – Part 1 of the NAIC database that go up to the 
nine previous years. Hence,  it lr is the relative change in the volatility of the loss ratio due 
only to the underwriting result of the current year. 
  Our main independent variable to explain the change in the volatility of loss ratio is the 
Growth rate in the amount of reinsurance purchased measured as  1 , 1 , Re Re Re Re t i t i it it  
where it Re is  defined  as  the  premiums  ceded  to  non  affiliates.  As  with  the  cost  function 
estimation, as a robustness check, we also use the share of premiums ceded to non affiliates as an 17 
 
alternative measure of reinsurance. 
  To control for the change in insurers’ exposure to underwriting risk, we use the growth 
rate  of  total  premiums  written  in  each  type  of  business  (short  and  long-tail,  personal  and 
commercial). In addition, we control for the change in the level of diversification of underwriting 
activities. For that purpose, we use the Growth rate in line concentration and the Growth rate in 
geographic  concentration.  Line  concentration  is  computed  as  the  Herfindahl  index  of  the 
percentage  of  premiums  in  each  line  of  business  written  by  the  insurer,  and  geographic 
concentration is computed as the Herfindahl index of the percentage of premiums written in each 
state by the insurer. A higher Herfindahl index implies that the insurer is concentrated in fewer 
lines of business or in fewer states. Since large insurers are likely to be more diversified, we use 
also the Growth rate in size. We measure insurers’ size as the natural logarithm of total assets.  
We control for insurer specific characteristics by including the Stock ownership dummy, 
Group  dummy,  and  Distribution  dummy  as  defined  previously.  Finally,  we  include  yearly 
dummy variables (Year96-Year03) to take into account the effect of time. 
4.4. Summary Statistics 
Summary  statistics  for  all  variables  used  in  cost  function  and  reinsurance  benefits 
estimation  are  presented  in  Table  1.  Insurers  ceded  on  average  about  $124  million/year  of 
premiums to non affiliated reinsurers, representing about 21 percent of total premiums written 
and  assumed  from  non  affiliates  during  the  period  1995-2003.  The  insurers  in  the  sample 
produced more personal insurance than commercial insurance, and they produced more long-tail 
insurance than short-tail insurance. The average amount invested in financial assets is $1,926 
million, the average return required by policyholders is 6 percent, and the average required return 
by equity holders is 17 percent.   
[Table 1] 
Table  1  also  indicates  that  the  average  volatility  of  the  loss  ratio  is  9  percent.  The 
insurance  firms  are  more likely  to  be organized  as insurance  groups and  more  likely  to  use 18 
 
independent agents to sell their policies.  The number of stock insurers in the sample is almost 
equal to the number of mutuals. During the1995-2003 period, insurers increased on average the 
volume of premiums written in each type of business and the average volatility of the loss ratio 
increased, at the same time, they increased on average their reinsurance purchases, their business 
diversification, and their geographical diversification.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Costs Analysis 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the first stage regressions of the endogenous 
variables.
9 The adjusted R
2 for Asset-liability risk (0.48), Invested assets (0.50) and Premiums 
ceded  to  non  affiliates  (0.38)  are  relatively  high.  Several  coefficients  associated  with  the 
instruments are statistically significant. Some interesting results show up from these regressions. 
For instance, insurer groups have significantly higher Asset-liability risk, Invested assets, and 
Premiums  ceded  to  non-affiliates  than  unaffiliated  single  insurers.  This  is  consistent  with 
insurance groups being larger and more sophisticated than unaffiliated single insurers. Insurers 
that  use  independent  agents  have  lower  Asset-liability  risk,  lower  Invested  assets,  and  less 
Premiums ceded to non-affiliates than direct writer insurers. Thus, insurers that use independent 
agents are more active in asset-liability management but less active in the reinsurance market than 
insurers using direct marketing or exclusive agents.  
Table  2  also  shows  that  stock  insurers  purchase  significantly  more  reinsurance  than 
mutual insurers. In the prior literature, empirical results about the effect of organizational form on 
reinsurance demand are mixed. Mayers and Smith (1990) find that mutual insurers utilize more 
reinsurance than stock insurers. On the other hand, Garven and Lamm-Tenant (2003) find no 
significant difference, whereas Cole and McCullough (2006) find that stock insurers purchase 
more reinsurance than mutuals. These differences in the results may be due to the measure of 
                                                 
9  The  Hausman  general  test  shows  that  reinsurance,  asset-liability  risk  and  financial  intermediation 
variables are endogenous in the cost function specification described by equation (3). 19 
 
reinsurance purchase used or the time period examined. Our empirical results show that stock 
insurers purchase more reinsurance from non affiliated insurers than do mutual insurers. This 
finding  is  expected  given  the  importance  of  stockholders-policyholders  incentives  conflicts 
among stock insurers and the higher involvement of stock insurers in complex lines of business.
10 
[Table 2] 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of the cost function as specified in equation 
(3)  with random  intercept  and  random  coefficients associated  with  the  risk  management  and 
financial intermediation variables. Model 1 is specified with Invested assets and Asset-liability 
risk but without a reinsurance variable, Model 2 includes a reinsurance variable defined as the 
quantity of Premiums ceded to non-affiliates, and Model 3 is specified with a reinsurance variable 
defined as Share ceded to non-affiliates. The inclusion of the reinsurance purchase as a quality 
variable  enhances  the  cost  function  specification  and  allows  it  to  account  for  the  level  of 
underwriting risk being covered by professional reinsurers.  
[Table 3] 
The results for Model 1 show that the coefficient for Invested assets is negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level. A negative coefficient means that the financial intermediation 
activities decrease the insurance activity costs. The coefficient for Asset-liability risk is positive 
and also significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, insurers with higher surplus durations or lower 
risk management have higher insolvency risk and higher insurance costs, primarily due to higher 
costs of debt and equity capital. The results for financial intermediation and risk management are 
in line with those found by Cummins et al. (2006). 
The results of Model 2 show that the coefficient associated with Premiums ceded to non-
affiliates  is  positive  and  significant  at  the  1  percent  level.  A  positive  coefficient  means  that 
                                                 
10 Head office state dummy variables control the effect of the state insurance regulations. Regulation could 
limit managerial discretion in investment and risk management decisions. Many of these dummy variables 
are statistically significant. Results for the 50 head office state dummies are available. 
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insurers ceding more premiums to non-affiliated insurers have higher insurance costs. This result 
confirms  that  reinsurance  is  costly,  as  it  increases  the  cost  of  producing  insurance  services. 
Results for Model 2 show that the coefficient associated with Asset-liability risk is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and the coefficient for Invested assets is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
The results obtained for Model 3 show that the coefficient associated with the  Share 
ceded  to  non-affiliates  is  positive  and  significant  at  the  1  percent  level.  Thus,  even  after 
controlling for the quantity of premiums written and assumed, ceding premiums to non affiliated 
insurers increases the total costs incurred by direct insurers. The results for Invested assets and 
Asset-liability risk remain significant with the same signs as in Model 1 and Model 2. 
5.1. Benefits Analysis 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the first stage regressions of the endogenous 
variables in the volatility of the loss ratio specification described by equation (4). Results from 
Hausman tests show that endogeneity of the growth rate of insurers’ size and the growth rate of 
reinsurance is not rejected.
11 
[Table 4] 
Table  5  presents  the  results  of  the  estimation  of  reinsurance  benefits  as  specified  in 
equation (4). Model 1 is specified with a reinsurance variable defined as the Growth rate of 
premiums ceded to non-affiliates, and Model 2 is specified with a reinsurance variable defined as 
the Growth rate of share of premiums ceded to non-affiliates.  
[Table 5] 
The  results  for  Model  1  show  that  the  coefficient  associated  with  Growth  rate  of 
premiums ceded to non affiliates is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Thus, ceding more premiums to non affiliated insurers decreases significantly the volatility of the 
loss ratio. This result confirms that reinsurance purchasing stabilizes loss experience. The results 
                                                 
11 Details regarding the Hausman test results are available from the authors on request. 21 
 
obtained with Model 1 show also that writing more premiums or increasing the diversification of 
underwriting activities do not affect significantly the volatility of the loss ratio. However, group 
insurers and mutual insurers have significantly higher growth rates of loss ratio volatility. 
The results obtained for Model 2 show that the coefficient associated with the Growth 
rate of share of premiums ceded to non affiliates is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. Hence, ceding a larger share of written premiums to non affiliated insurers 
reduces significantly the volatility of the loss ratio. Results for the other variables are qualitatively 
the same as those obtained with Model 1 except for the coefficient associated with the growth rate 
of  size  which  becomes  statistically  significant.  Increasing  the  size  of  insurers  reduces 
significantly the growth rate of the volatility of the loss ratio. 
6. Conclusion 
Even though insurers can reduce underwriting risk significantly by diversification and 
risk  management,  significant  residual  risk  remains  and  insurers’  claim  payments  are  highly 
stochastic. One of the most important tools for managing insurance claim risk is reinsurance. 
Reinsurance reduces insurers’ insolvency risk by stabilizing loss experience, increasing capacity, 
limiting liability on specific risks, and/or protecting against catastrophes. In addition, reinsurance 
reduces  the incentive  conflict between the  different stakeholders and consequently  it reduces 
agency costs. However, transferring risk to reinsurers is expensive. Reinsurance prices can be  
several times the actuarial price of the risk transferred (Froot, 2001).  
This  article  estimates  the  effects  of  reinsurance  on  insurers’  costs  and  insurers’ 
underwriting risk by analyzing a sample of U.S. property-liability insurers over the 1995-2003 
period. To estimate the effect of reinsurance on insurers’ costs, we consider reinsurance as an 
output attribute of the insurance services produced, and we estimate a parametric cost function. 
To estimate the effect of reinsurance on insurers’ underwriting risk, we consider the growth rate 22 
 
of reinsurance purchase as a determinant of the growth rate of the volatility of the loss ratio, 
controlling for the growth of insurers’ exposure to underwriting risk. 
The empirical results clearly indicate that reinsurance increases significantly the costs of 
producing  insurance  services  and  reduces  significantly  the  volatility  of  the  loss  ratio.  These 
results are robust to the use of alternative reinsurance measures: the quantity of premiums ceded 
to non affiliates and the share of total premiums that are ceded to non affiliates. Thus, insurers 
purchasing reinsurance accept to pay higher costs for the production of insurance services to 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics: 1995 2003 
Variable                               Mean          Standard Deviation 
Premiums ceded to non affiliates  124.15  448.54 
Total premiums ceded  624.42  2485.29 
Share ceded to non affiliates  0.21  0.18 
Premiums ceded to total premiums  0.32  0.20 
Invested assets  1926.00  6758.46 
Asset-liability risk  18116.37  73846.93 
Long-tail personal outputs  221.30  1090.78 
Short-tail personal outputs  99.62  501.45 
Long-tail commercial outputs  225.94  731.54 
Short-tail commercial outputs  60.40  191.40 
Price of long-tail personal  0.41  0.66 
Price of short-tail personal  0.53  0.96 
Price of long-tail commercial  1.30  7.66 
Price of Short-tail commercial  0.89  2.59 
Administrative labour  945.33  170.26 
Agent labour  800.99  150.46 
Risk labour  2050.42  1091.83 
Material/Business labour  609.43  194.60 
Debt Price  0.06  0.02 
Equity Price  0.17  0.06 
Equity  984.52  3930.24 
Debt  1310.10  4131.37 
Total Costs  499.25  1637.21 
Volatility of loss ratio  0.0926  0.0844 
Size  19.40  2.11 
Long-tail personal premiums  323.38  1541.18 
Short-tail personal premiums  158.18  751.04 
Long-tail commercial premiums  351.08  1158.61 
Short-tail commercial premiums  117.93  377.89 
Line concentration  0.31  0.15 
Geographic concentration  0.49  0.38 
Group dummy  0.68  0.47 
Stock ownership dummy  0.51  0.50 
Distribution dummy  0.67  0.47 
Number of observations                                   2966 
Number of firms                                    554 
 
Note: Quantities of intermediate outputs, quantities of outputs and quantity of reinsurance are in million of 












Results from First Stage Regressions for Cost Function Estimation 
 
 
  Asset-liability risk  Invested assets 
Ceded premiums to  
non affiliates 
Variable  Estimate  t Value  Estimate  t Value  Estimate  t Value 
Intercept  -3.4016  -17.23  -2.7299  -15.71  -2.7429  -15.90 
Price of long-tail personal  0.0506  2.78  0.0322  2.01  -0.0185  -1.17 
Price of short-tail personal  0.1052  4.94  0.1079  5.76  0.0748  4.02 
Price of long-tail commercial  0.0281  1.74  0.0143  1.01  0.0188  1.34 
Price of Short-tail commercial  0.0883  3.93  0.0713  3.60  0.0535  2.72 
Price of administrative labour  0.6180  0.74  0.4953  0.68  0.4791  0.66 
Price of agent labour  0.5672  1.33  0.9392  2.49  -0.6901  -1.85 
Price of risk labour  -0.3141  -1.22  -0.0942  -0.41  0.3772  1.67 
Price of material/business labour  0.7130  1.40  0.9458  2.11  1.4515  3.26 
Debt Price  1.5549  3.95  2.1048  6.07  1.0641  3.09 
Equity Price  -0.6351  -3.09  -0.5657  -3.12  0.1125  0.63 
Distribution dummy  -0.9103  -12.40  -0.8152  -12.61  -0.3184  -4.96 
Stock ownership dummy   -0.0379  -0.52  0.0987  1.54  0.3479  5.47 
Group dummy   2.6431  35.83  2.3554  36.26  1.9487  30.22 
Number of observations  2966  2966  2966 
Number of Insurers  554  554  554 
Adjusted R-sq  0.4868  0.5054  0.3820 
 
 
Note: Results for time dummy variables and state dummy variables are available upon request. Results for 


















  Cost Function Estimates (Equation 3) 
 
Model 1: Specified without reinsurance 
Model 2: Specified with reinsurance defined as Premiums ceded to non affiliates 
Model 3: Specified with reinsurance defined as Share of premiums ceded to non-affiliates 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
   Estimate  t-ratio  Estimate  t-ratio  Estimate  t-ratio 
Intercept  13.3993  212.00  13.5267  182.61  13.7071  116.20 
Financial intermediation  -0.5793  -4.95  -0.7538  -4.81  -0.5207  -2.60 
Asset-liability risk  0.7790  7.19  0.8673  6.72  0.8549  4.16 
Reinsurance      0.1696  2.75  0.3482  2.64 
Long-tail personal   0.2338  15.04  0.2157  13.61  0.1920  9.95 
Short-tail personal  0.0837  5.52  0.0905  5.92  0.1024  5.76 
Long-tail commercial  0.2586  23.32  0.2600  22.75  0.2626  18.56 
Short-tail commercial  0.1207  8.94  0.1309  9.47  0.1315  7.40 
Agent labour  0.4643  2.99  0.8499  4.96  1.3033  5.13 
Risk labour  0.1466  2.99  0.1208  2.30  0.1052  1.56 
Business labour  0.0641  0.70  -0.0565  -0.57  -0.0207  -0.16 
Debt Price  0.0945  1.24  0.1499  1.92  0.0937  1.11 
Equity Price  0.3870  10.54  0.3285  8.22  0.3970  8.43 
Year96  -0.1055  -8.62  -0.0947  -7.56  -0.0967  -7.70 
Year97  -0.0331  -2.45  -0.0214  -1.55  -0.0320  -2.36 
Year98  -0.0951  -4.73  -0.0688  -3.21  -0.0870  -4.22 
Year99  0.0018  0.08  -0.0016  -0.07  -0.0033  -0.15 
Year00  -0.0431  -1.83  -0.0398  -1.69  -0.0449  -1.91 
Year01  -0.0618  -1.24  -0.0355  -0.71  -0.0419  -0.84 
Year02  0.0418  0.56  0.0286  0.39  0.0435  0.59 
Year03  0.2495  2.64  0.1983  2.11  0.2411  2.57 
Number of observations  2966  2966  2966 
Number of Insurers  554  554  554 
 -2 Log Likelihood  -189  -183.6  -183.8 
 
Results for second-order terms are available from the authors upon request.  29 
 
TABLE 4 




Growth rate of  Growth rate of 
size (log of total assets)  premiums ceded 
Variable  Estimate  t Value  Estimate  t Value 
Intercept  0.01406  2.45  6.24959  1.65 
Price of long-tail personal  0.00057  2.16  0.29511  1.70 
Price of short-tail personal  -0.00010  -0.56  -0.05795  -0.48 
Price of long-tail commercial  0.00002  0.89  0.00097  0.07 
Price of Short-tail commercial  0.00013  1.95  0.00283  0.06 
Price of administrative labour  -0.00001  -2.43  0.00056  0.20 
Price of agent labour  -0.00001  -2.42  -0.00376  -2.13 
Price of risk labour  0.00000  3.49  0.00018  0.57 
Price of material/business labour  0.00000  0.94  0.00205  0.94 
Debt Price  0.06513  1.11  -54.01708  -1.39 
Equity Price  -0.02328  -3.84  -4.25408  -1.06 
Distribution dummy  -0.00065  -1.66  -0.41769  -1.61 
Stock ownership dummy   0.00113  2.85  0.47825  1.83 
Group dummy   -0.00137  -3.40  0.09660  0.36 
Number of observations  2966  2966 
Number of Insurers  554  554 
Adjusted R-sq  0.0432  0.0157 
 
 
Note: Results for time dummy variables and state dummy variables are available upon request. Results for 






























Volatility of Loss Ratio Estimates (Equation4) 
 
Model 1: Specified with reinsurance defined as Premiums ceded to non affiliates 
Model 2: Specified with reinsurance defined as Share of premiums ceded to non-affiliates 
 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
   Estimate  t-ratio  Estimate  t-ratio 
Intercept  0.027180  2.10  0.033900  2.59 
Growth rate of  reinsurance  -0.013020  -2.62  -0.030140  -1.96 
Growth rate of  size  -1.989150  -1.23  -3.145200  -2.04 
Growth rate of  long-tail personal premiums  0.000006  0.35  0.000006  0.34 
Growth rate of  short-tail personal premiums  -0.000074  -0.83  -0.000066  -0.73 
Growth rate of  long-tail commercial premiums  0.001500  1.59  0.001470  1.56 
Growth rate of  short-tail commercial premiums  -0.000050  -0.60  -0.000051  -0.62 
Growth rate of  business concentration  -0.009420  -0.46  -0.011200  -0.55 
Growth rate of  geographic concentration  -0.011140  -1.01  -0.011510  -1.04 
Group dummy  0.017260  2.80  0.014470  2.34 
Stock ownership dummy  -0.016380  -2.73  -0.015820  -2.55 
Distribution dummy  -0.000082  -0.01  0.001200  0.20 
Year96  0.063030  5.91  0.060610  5.64 
Year97  -0.011880  -1.11  -0.012460  -1.16 
Year98  0.008500  0.77  0.005680  0.51 
Year99  0.016990  1.26  0.005790  0.48 
Year00  0.018480  1.47  0.015950  1.28 
Year01  0.025860  2.34  0.024090  2.19 
Year02  0.009520  0.86  0.008820  0.79 
Year03  0.027500  2.44  0.028080  2.48 
Number of observations  2966  2966 
Number of Insurers  554  554 
Adjusted R-sq  0.0309  0.0299 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 